Economic Consequences of the Intifada: Investment and Political Instability in Israel by David Fielding
1
  Economic Consequences of the Intifada:
 Investment and Political Instability in Israel
 David  Fielding 
  Department of Economics, 
  University of Leicester, 
 University  Road, 
  Leicester LE1 7RH, UK* 
Abstract
We construct a time-series model of investment in Israel that 
incorporates both traditional economic factors derived from a theoretical 
model of a profit-maximising representative firm and indicators of 
political instability and unrest. This is used to estimate the extent to 
which the Intifada has depressed Israeli investment and the size of the 
corresponding "peace dividend". 
JEL Classification: O16; E22 
Keywords: Investment, Political Instability, Israel 
ņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņ
* E-mail DJF14@LE.AC.UK; telephone +44-116-252-3909; fax +44-116-252-2908. 1
1. Political Instability, Investment and Growth
The 1990s have seen a boom in research attempting to explain the extent to which differences in 
economic performance across countries are due to social and political rather than narrowly 
economic factors. The starting point for much of this research is growth theory, and the 
methodology applied often involves the modification of traditional economic growth models to 
include social and political features. Because continuous time-series data on political indicators 
is often limited, empirical research has focussed on cross-country comparisons, and in particular 
the panel data sets compiled by the World Bank. 
  Many of the papers using cross-country panel data to examine hypotheses about 
convergence in GDP growth rates now include indicators of the quality of each country's society 
and polity. Among these are the degree of democracy, the degree to which civil and political 
rights are respected and the incidence of political violence. It is thought that the absence of 
democracy or civil and political rights, or the presence of political violence, may increase the 
risks associated with long term investment and so depress factor accumulation. In addition, they 
may disrupt economic activity or distort factor allocation, reducing factor productivity and 
hence investment demand. A large number of the papers are surveyed by Alesina and Perotti 
(1994); recent additions to the literature include Easterly and Levine (1997) and Fedderke and 
Klitgaard (1998). Whilst different papers find different sociopolitical indicators to be significant 
in explaining variations across countries, there is a consensus that a substantial fraction of the 
variation is to be explained by the quality of a country's polity. However, it is often unclear to 
what extent political factors matter because they affect factor productivity and to what extent 
they matter because they affect factor accumulation. 
  For this reason a number of economists have used cross-country data to explore directly 
the link between the level of investment and the quality of the polity in which it takes place. All 
authors find some positive relationship, but there is no consensus about the appropriate 
indicator(s) of polity quality. Alesina and Perotti (1993) explain variations in cross-country 
investment performance by using a "sociopolitical instability index" constructed by principal 
components analysis. The important factors in the index are indicators of the absence of 
democracy and the incidence of political violence. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) and de Haan 
and Siermann (1996) discover a negative cross-country correlation between the investment-
GDP ratio and both the frequency of changes of government and indices of political freedom. 2
Svensson (1998), drawing on the work of Tornell and Velasco (1992), uses international cross-
sectional data to investigate the link between the investment-GDP ratio and various measures of 
polity quality. He finds that part of the variation in investment performance can be explained by 
differences in the quality of property rights; no other aspect of the quality of a polity has any 
significant explanatory power. 
  An additional issue raised by Collier and Gunning (1999) is that political instability and 
risk may affect not only aggregate investment but also the composition of investment. In risky 
environments, the demand for nontraded capital goods (buildings and other construction works) 
may be particularly low, because these not geographically mobile and cannot be shipped out to 
another area if there is a major breakdown in civil society. Some traded capital goods 
(machinery and equipment) are more mobile, and therefore less of a risk. An increase in 
political instability may therefore reduce construction investment more than machinery and 
equipment investment. 
  Whatever the precise nature of the link between polity and investment, this work does 
not directly address the question of whether an individual country can improve its investment 
performance by improving the quality of its political system. No-one seriously claims that the 
causal link between political and economic performance is homogenous throughout the World, 
so slope coefficients on political variables in cross-country regressions are to be interpreted as 
the mean effect on economic performance of a certain political characteristic, across countries in 
the sample.
1 Here the potential value of econometric evidence on individual countries using 
time-series data - were it available - would be very high. 
  One country for which time-series data on indicators of political stability do exist, and in 
which these indicators have exhibited a large degree of variability in recent years, is Israel.
2 In 
this paper we will construct a macro-econometric model of investment in Israel conditioned on 
indictors of political stability that correspond to some of those used in cross-sectional analyses. 
The indicators will nevertheless be motivated by existing empirical political science specific to 
Israel. The model will distinguish between different types of capital good, in order to address 
1 One serious problem with the panel data regressions is the difficulty in producing an unbiased estimate of this 
mean value. See Pesaran and Smith (1995). 
2 The term "Israel" will be used to denote the geographical area currently governed from Jerusalem, i.e. the State 
of Israel within its 1948 borders plus the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights. All place names are purely 
geographical and have no geopolitical implications. 3
the point made by Collier and Gunning (1999). The estimated parameters in this model will then 
be used to calculate the probable impact on Israeli investment of an improvement in political 
stability, such as might result from a full peace agreement between those political groups that 
have been in violent conflict. Section 2 discusses relevant details from Israel's recent economic 
and political history; Section 3 presents the theoretical model, on which is based the 
econometric model in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Economics of the Intifada
As a consequence of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel currently governs territories outside its 
1948 borders, including the West Bank, i.e., territory west of the River Jordan but east of the 
1948 border, and the area around the city of Gaza. The majority of the population in these areas 
made up of Palestinian Arabs, many of whom contest the legitimacy of Israeli rule and Jewish 
settlement of the territories. In December 1987 there was a sudden uprising (Intifada) amongst 
Palestinians in these areas (Peretz, 1990). The uprising consisted of strikes and public 
demonstrations, which often escalated to the point where protestors were shot dead by Israeli 
security forces; later there was an increase in the number politically motivated assassinations 
and attacks on Israeli targets by Palestinian paramilitary groups, particularly Hamas. The 
uprising continued up to September 1993, when the Israeli Government signed an agreement 
with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (the Oslo Peace Accord). This agreement included 
PLO recognition of the State of Israel and Israeli recognition of the need for Palestinian self-
government in at least part of the West Bank and Gaza areas. The political structures envisaged 
by the Oslo Peace Accord have not yet been fully implemented, and the political violence and 
instability have not ceased. 
  Razin and Sadka (1993, chapter 6) list some of the direct economic consequences of the 
uprising. Amongst the factors contributing to economic disruption were strikes, boycotts of 
Israeli goods and tax evasion by Palestinians; and government controls on population 
movement, curfews and restrictions on the size of bank deposits.  The first years of the Intifada
saw a sharp deterioration in economic performance in the territories. There was estimated to be 
10.1% fall in GDP in the West Bank in 1987, a 1.1% fall in 1988 (which would have been much 
larger, were it not for a bumper olive crop), and  6.2% fall in 1989. 
  Although accurate figures for the territories are difficult to calculate for the whole of the 4
period, the impact of the Intifada on productive investment within the West Bank and Gaza 
areas may well be relatively small. Economic growth in the territories the years up to 1987 came 
though an expansion of trade and services, not through industrialisation (Razin and Sadka, 
1993, p. 87). Most investment in the area was in the form of residential construction associated 
with the growth of Jewish settlements. However, the Intifada represented an increase in political 
instability for Israel as a whole that may well have depressed investment demand. The risk to 
investors might be manifested through a number of channels: 
1. The possibility of injury to person or property in paramilitary attacks; 
2. The possibility of the uprising spreading to Arab Israelis,
3 who became much more politicised 
in the 1980s (Mayer, 1988; Rouhana, 1989, 1991);  
3. For Arab investors, the possibility of the loss of property rights as a result of Israeli security 
measures 
In the next section, we will refer to existing studies on the perception of political uncertainty in 
Israel in order to motivate the calculation of time-varying quantitative measures of risk. These 
measures will be used in a model of investment for the whole of Israel, in order to estimate the 
sensitivity of aggregate investment to changes in the degree of perceived political instability 
over time. Estimation of the impact of political instability will be nested in an economic model 
of aggregate investment. 
3. An Integrative Model of Investment
In this section we describe the model of investment that we will use to explore the potential 
links between political instability and investment performance. Section 4 will present the results 
of estimating this model using the Israeli quarterly data for the period 1987-98. 
  In Appendix 1 we derive a theoretical economic model, based on the profit-maximising 
behaviour of a representative firm, which relates gross investment in (i) non-residential 
construction, B, and (ii) machinery and equipment, M, to economic conditions. The form of the 
relationship is: 
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t is gross investment in each type of capital in period t, C't the real interest rate (adjusted 
for capital depreciation), P
i
t the real purchase price of capital goods of type i, Wt the real wage 
rate, Yt the output level of the average firm and u
i
t an i.i.d. residual. The intercept b
i
0 may have a 
seasonal component. In the long run, investment will depend negatively on costs and positively 
on aggregate output; in the short run, lower past investment in one type of capital will tend to 
depress investment in the other type, ceteris paribus (if you don't own a factory right now, 
there's no point in buying machines to put in it until you do). The functional form in equation 
(1) is based on a number of assumptions, outlined in Appendix 1, which might be invalid; so it 
will be important in any econometric analysis based on equation (1) to test the robustness of the 
equation used. 
  This model might be overly restrictive because it does not allow for political factors to 
affect investment decisions. As outlined in Section 1, increases in either political violence and 
unrest, or in uncertainty surrounding the future nature of the polity, could reduce investment 
because they represent an increase in risk against which it is impossible to hedge fully. (As 
noted in Section 1, these effects may be more marked with respect to construction than with 
respect to machinery and equipment investment, if the latter is more geographically or sectorally 
mobile). Moreover, the economic disruption associated with violence and unrest could directly 
increase firms' costs.
4
  A realistic model of investment in Israel must allow for the potential impact of political 
conditions in some way. The simplest approach is to use a dummy variable in a time-series 
regression for the variable of interest. Earlier papers on the economic impact of the Intifada (for 
4 Increased uncertainty may also induce hysteresis in an individual firm's investment decisions (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994), with asymmetries in the response of investment to positive and negative shocks. However, as shown 
by Caballero (1993), these effects are unlikely to generate asymmetries at the aggregate level. In aggregate there 
may be "excess" smoothness in the response of investment demand to changes in returns, which will be manifested 
as a higher value of the adjustment cost parameters φ and ψ in the model in Appendix 1 and  
so higher values of Στ g
i
τ and Στ h
i
τ in equation 1. Since we do not try to separate hysteresis from adjustment cost 
effects, we may be understating the effect of uncertainty on investment. 6
example Fishelson, 1993) have estimated regression equations beginning before the start of the 
unrest and ending afterwards, interpreting the coefficient on a dummy variable for the period of 
unrest as the net economic impact of the uprising. One drawback of this approach is that a single 
dummy variable is difficult to interpret unambiguously: the Intifada started not long after the 
end of the Israeli hyperinflation period, and a single dummy might conflate the effects of 
increasing political instability with decreasing macroeconomic instability. 
  More recently there have been survey-based studies on the factors associated with the 
subjective perceptions of insecurity amongst Arabs and Jews in Israel. Rouhana and Fiske 
(1995) use factor analysis to explore the characteristics of Israeli society and politics that evoke 
a sense of threat in survey respondents. There are 22 characteristics in their questionnaire; the 
ones evoking the greatest sense of threat in Jewish respondents are: 
1. "Attacks and acts of sabotage"; 
2. "Arabs in Israel join the uprising"; 
3. "The uprising in the territories". 
The ones evoking the greatest sense of threat in Arab respondents are: 
4. "Expropriation of Arab land"; 
5. "Discussions about expulsion of Arabs"; 
6. "Rise in strength of the right wing / Jewish religious movement". 
If the intensity of these characteristics increases (for example, if the number of attacks increases 
or more Arab land is expropriated) then perceptions of insecurity amongst Jews and Arabs are 
likely to become more intense. One consequence of this might be a reduction in investment by 
the Jewish or Arab communities. Moreover, it is possible to construct time series relating to the 
intensity of these characteristics. 
  With regard to characteristics 1-3, we can refer to monthly figures for the number of 
Israelis killed in politically motivated attacks, which are now in the public domain (for example 
IRIS, 1999), as are annual figures on total deaths including both Israelis and Palestinians (for 
example B'Tselem, 1999). The monthly data on Israeli deaths can be summed to create a 7
quarterly series that can be used in conjunction with the quarterly macroeconomic data; and an 
approximate quarterly time series for total deaths can be interpolated from the annual data, for 
example by the method of Lisman and Sandee (1964).
5 We would expect investment to be 
negatively correlated with the fatality statistics, either because of the resulting increase in the 
perceived degree of security by investors or because they are associated with unrest that directly 
disrupts economic activity. The degree of perceived insecurity may depend on either the number 
of Jewish deaths, or the total number of deaths, or both figures. Jewish deaths represent a direct 
threat; the number Palestinian deaths is an indicator of the intensity of the uprising. The number 
of Israeli deaths (in thousands per quarter) will be denoted ISRKt; the total number of deaths (in 
thousands per quarter) will be denoted ALLKt. Figure 1 illustrates the fatality statistics. Total 
fatalities peak at 336 in 1989 and again at 242 in 1993 (the second peak is related to an increase 
in the number of attacks by Hamas after the signing of the Oslo Peace Accord); Israeli fatalities 
peak at 87 in 1996. 
  With respect to characteristic 4, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics publishes 
quarterly data on the number of buildings completed in Jewish settlements in the West Bank 
and Gaza areas.
6 Not all building in the West Bank and Gaza areas is on expropriated land; but 
it might be the case that Arabs perceive the expansion of the West Bank and Gaza settlements to 
be at the expense of Arab property rights, in which case an increase in the rate of expansion will 
be linked to an intensification of the perceptions of insecurity associated with characteristic 4, 
and so to lower investment. The rate of growth of the number of buildings completed in Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas will be denoted ∆ln(CWBG)t. In the regression 
analysis to follow we will use lags of this variable, because we cannot assume that it is 
independent of total investment. Figure 2 illustrates the CWBG series. The house building 
figure peaks at 7,370 per quarter in 1993 (coinciding with the second peak in the total fatality 
statistics), then levels of at around 400 per quarter in the late 1990s. 
  Characteristics 5-6 relate to the strength of (extreme) right-wing political opinion. The 
only direct measure of the strength of political opinion is in election results; so it is difficult to 
5 Characteristic 2 suggests that the location of Intifada-related attacks might matter. Data on the location of 
attacks are available (B'Tselem, 1999); but such figures were never significant when included in regression 
equations of the type presented in Section 3. 
6 Figures before 1990 are reported only annually; the quarterly figures for 1988-9 are interpolations. 8
construct a quantification of these characteristics with very much time series variation. For this 
reason we will use dummy variables: one for quarters following the Labour Party victory in the 
summer of 1992 (denoted LABIN), and one following the Labour Party defeat in the summer of 
1996 (denoted LABOUT). We anticipate investment to be higher under a Labour administration 
because Labour politicians are perceived to be less tolerant of extreme right-wing views than are 
politicians of the Likud coalition. (However, there are more prosaic explanations for a positive 
Labour Party dummy, since the different political parties have different economic policy 
programmes.) 
  In addition to these factors there is one other event which might be associated with 
changes in investment demand: the signing of the Oslo Peace Accord between the Israeli 
Government and the PLO in September 1993. This accord provided for the recognition of the 
State of Israel by the PLO and for the creation of a Palestinian state in part of the West Bank / 
Gaza. Al-Haj et al. (1993) present survey results outlining Jewish and Arab attitudes to the 
creation of a Palestinian state. 69% of the Jewish sample responded that the existence of such a 
state would reduce their own personal safety, and 18% responded that it would increase their 
personal safety. By contrast, the corresponding figures for the Arab sample are 6% and 76%. 
Given that the majority of the Israeli population is Jewish, we might expect the accord to have 
resulted in lower investment, if these figures are representative of investors in each community. 
But besides being a cause of changes in the level of uncertainty, the Accord may also be a 
consequence of increased uncertainty. Astorino-Courtois (1995) argues that Palestinian and 
Israeli peace negotiators are more inclined to moderate behaviour and co-operation in decision 
environments characterised by uncertainty. Here "uncertainty" refers to the degree of complexity 
in analysis of foreign policy issues, of which one major factor is the degree of transparency / 
ambiguity in leaders' public speeches and behaviour; but this kind of uncertainty may also affect 
investors' perceptions of risk. So a period of high co-operation (such as at Oslo) may reflect a 
high level of uncertainty which also happens to discourage investment. We will include in our 
model a dummy variable for periods following the Accord (denoted OSLO). 
  In the next section we will estimate investment equations which allow for the political 
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This will allow us to evaluate the extent to which political instability and unrest have depressed 
investment in the Israeli economy, and to determine whether these factors have influenced 
construction more than machinery and equipment investment. 
4. Modelling Investment in Israel
In this section we present the estimation and interpretation of the investment model represented 
by equation (2) above. The sources for the political time series have already been discussed; the 
economic data are taken from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics' Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics (much of which is available via the CBS website http://www.cbs.gov.il); Figure 3 
depicts the ln(I
B) and ln(I
M) series; Appendix 2 details the construction of the variables in the 
econometric model.
3.1 Cointegrating Relationships
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables of interest. The first part of the table lists 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistics (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) for all of the variables: it is 
possible to reject the null that the series are I(1) only in the case of ln(P
B), ln(P
M), ∆ln(CWBG), 
ISRK and ALLK. For the other variables (ln(I
B), ln(I
M), ln(Y), ln(W) and ln(C')) this null cannot 
be rejected, although the null that they are I(2) can. So it is appropriate to estimate the model by 
first looking for a cointegrating relationship between ln(I









3⋅ln(C')    (3) 
and  then  constructing  a  regression  equation  of  the  form:                         10
 Figure  : Annual Deaths in the Intifada
  Figure 2: Logarithm of Number of Buildings Completed per Quarter in Jewish 
  Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Areas 11
  Figure 3: Logarithms of Real Investment in Machinery and Equipment (I
M)
  and Non-Residential Construction (I
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3⋅ln(C')t    (5) 
Equation (3) is isomorphic with equation (2). We anticipate that for the ∆ln(I
B)t equation, 1 > d
i
9
> 0 > d
i
8 > -1; and for the ∆ln(I
M)t equation, 1 > d
i
8 > 0 > d
i
9 > -1, ensuring that the system is 








t The two possible ways of testing for cointegration are the methods outlined by Johansen 
(1988) and by Engle and Granger (1987). Neither method is more powerful than the other in all 
small samples (Reimers, 1991); but one disadvantage of the Engle-Granger method is that it 
allows for the existence of no more than one cointegrating vector between the variables of 
interest. We will employ both methods and then compare the results. Table 2 shows that these 
are very similar.
7 The Engle-Granger method is applied by calculating an Augmented Dickey-








B)t - [(Στ bτ)⋅ln(Y)t + (Στ cτ)⋅ln(W)t]/[1 - Στ aτ]   (6) 
The parameters aτ, bτ and cτ are estimated from a dynamic regression of ln(I
B) on ln(Y) and 
ln(W): 
 ln(I
B)t = Στ aτ⋅ln(I





t is an i.i.d. residual.
8 The variable ln(C') is omitted from the regression for reasons 
discussed below. The null of no cointegration, i.e., that ε
B
t is I(1), can be rejected at the 5% 
level, as can the same null using the Johansen method, which constructs the µi from estimates of 
a VAR of the I(1) variables. (Moreover, the null that there is no more than one cointegrating 
vector cannot be rejected using the Johansen method.) The estimates of µi derived from each 
method are very similar: 2.697 and -2.258 for the Engle-Granger method in comparison with 
2.751 and -2.476 for the Johansen method. These figures imply a positive long run relationship 
between construction investment and aggregate output, and a negative relationship between 
construction investment and the real wage rate. We therefore conclude that ln(I
B) is cointegrated 
with ln(Y) and ln(W); the regressions below construct ε
B
t on the basis of the Johansen estimates 
7 With a large enough sample, the appropriate approach would be to use the Johansen method to search for two 
cointegrating vectors amongst ln(I
B), ln(I
M), ln(Y), ln(W) and ln(C'). With our small sample the power of tests for 
cointegration amongst five variables is likely to be very low indeed; so it is not surprising that we were unable to 
identify any cointegrating vectors by taking this approach. 
8 The lag order used is six. The original Engle-Granger method is based on a static regression, but in small 
samples omission of the dynamics is likely to increase the biases in the estimates of µi (Banerjee et al., 1993). 13
of the long run, but it makes very little difference if the Engle-Granger estimates are used 
instead.
  If the interest rate variable ln(C') is added to the vector of I(1) variables then its 
coefficient in the cointegrating vector is very small, and the null that it is equal to zero cannot be 
rejected; so we do not include a ln(C') term in our estimate of ε
B
t. The insignificance of interest 
rates is a frequent feature of investment regressions in LDCs, and may reflect capital market 
imperfections (Rama, 1993). 
(ii) ε
M
t The results for machinery and equipment investment are more ambiguous. ln(C') is again 
unimportant, but now it is possible to reject the null of no cointegration between ln(I
M), ln(Y) 
and ln(W) only with the Engle-Granger method, and not with the Johansen method. In the 
absence of any finite sample results demonstrating that one method is more powerful than the 
other, it is not possible to adjudicate between the two on purely statistical grounds. However, 
eyeballing the ε
M
t series generated by the Engle-Granger method (Figure 4) suggests that there is 
a stationary linear combination of the three variables. We will use this series as an explanatory 
variable in the ∆ln(I
M) regressions; the coefficients on ln(Y) and ln(W) implicit in ε
M
t are 2.509 
and -1.408, which are again consistent with the theoretical model. 
3.2 The Investment Equations
Appendix 3 contains the parameter estimates, standard errors and descriptive statistics for OLS 
estimates of equation (4) for investment in the two types of capital; a lag order of four on the 
investment variables is required to ensure that the regression residuals are not autocorrelated. 
The sample period is 1988(2)-1998(3). Because it is not possible to assume that the economic 
variables on the RHS of equation (4) are weakly exogenous to investment, these variables are 
entered in the regression equation with a one-period lag. The very low t-ratios on some of the 
explanatory variables suggest that the regressions are over-parameterised, so Table 3 in the main 
text reports regressions in which some explanatory variables have been omitted so as to 
minimise the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (this model selection also happens to minimise the 
Hannan-Quinn Criterion and Akaike Information Criterion). Since different variables are 
omitted from the two regression equations, and u
B
t14
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
     (i) Stationarity Test Statistics 
tADF represents the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test stastistic. Values 
significant at the 5% level are shown in bold; Banerjee et al. (1993) 
provide critical values for the test. The other columns indicate the lag 
length and the presence of deterministic components in the ADF regression 
equation. The sample is 1987(1)-1998(3) less lags.
variable      tADF   max.  lag   trend   seasonals 
ln(IB)    -.69      4       -       x 
∆ln(IB)     -7.32      3       -       x 
ln(IM)    -.75      4       x       - 
∆ln(IM)   -10.65      0       -       x 
ln(Y)      -2.69        0       x       x 
∆ln(Y) -9.11      0       -       x 
ln(W)      -.3             -       x 
∆ln(W) -5.82      0       -       x 
ln(C')    -2.07        5       x       x 
∆ln(C')     -4.07      2       -       x 
ln(PB) -3.21      0       x       x 
ln(PM) -3.89      0       x       x 
∆ln(CWBG)     -8.12      0       -       - 
ISRK      -6.63      0       -       - 
ALLK      -4.77      3       x       - 
  (ii) Sample Moments: 988()-998(3)
variable         mean     std.  dev. 
∆ln(I
B)     0.02262      0.7200
∆ln(I
M)     0.0929      0.09579 
∆ln(Y)    0.0094      0.02420 
∆ln(W)    0.0009      0.0909
∆ln(C')     0.0037      0.03722 
ln(P
B)     0 . 760      0.0795
ln(P
M)     0.22200      0.5530
∆ln(CWBG)     0.0307      0.4500
ISRK  (000)     0.0074      0.078
ALLK  (000)     0.04247      0.02466 15
  Table 2: Cointegration Statistics
ln(IB): 1987(1) - 1998(4)
(i) Engle-Granger Method 
Estimated cointegrating vector (standard errors in parenthesis): 
ln(IB) = 2.697*ln(Y) - 2.258*ln(W) + ε
        (0.064)       (0.398)
ADF t-ratio on εt = -4.362 
(ii) Johansen method 
Degrees of Freedom Corrected Johansen Rank Test Statistics 
Correction based on Reimer (1991); 95% confidence interval shown
rank (p)  λ-max      95%     trace      95% 
 p = 0  30.01     2.0 34.99     29.7 
 p ≤        2.79     4.      4.98 5.4
 p ≤ 2      2.9      3.8      2.9      3.8 
First cointegrating relation: 
ln(IB) = 2.75*ln(Y) - 2.476*ln(W) 
ln(IM): 1987(1) - 1998(4)
(i) Engle-Granger Method 
Estimated cointegrating vector (standard errors in parenthesis): 
ln(IM) = 2.059*ln(Y) - .408*ln(W) + ε
        (0.049)       (0.38)
ADF t-ratio on εt = -6.02
(ii) Johansen method 
Degrees of Freedom Corrected Johansen Rank Test Statistics 
Correction based on Reimer (1991); 95% confidence interval shown
rank (p)  λ-max      95%     trace      95% 
 p = 0 2.24     2.0     2.45     29.7 
 p ≤      8.60     4.      9.2 5.4
 p ≤ 2      0.6      3.8      0.6      3.8 16
and u
M
t are correlated, the Maximum Likelihood estimates reported are different from OLS 
estimates. Appendix 3 reports SUR estimates of the two equations: the SUR coefficients are 





There is some heteroskedasticity in the parameter estimates, so Table 3 reports standard errors 
corrected by the method of White (1980) ("w.c.s.e.") alongside uncorrected ones. 
  As a check on robustness, the model was estimated recursively, beginning with a sample 
of 1988(2)-1994(3) and then extending the sample up to 1998(3). The one-step forecast errors 
for the two equations are plotted in Figure 5; none of the errors is significantly different from 
zero. Figure 6 shows one-step and break-point Chow Test statistics for the system; never are the 
statistics significant at the 10% level. 
  Because the equations are estimated in error-correction format, the dynamic interaction 
of I
B and I
M is not immediately transparent in Table 3. Table 4 lists the values of the coefficients 
on lags of ln(I
B) and ln(I
M) when the Table 3 equations have been rearranged so that the 
investment variables appear throughout in (log) levels. Table 4 indicates that the current level of 
investment in non-residential construction depends positively on its level and rate of growth this 
time last year; investment over the past three quarters appears not to matter. This suggests that 
the dynamics of construction investment is dominated by a seasonal pattern. Correspondingly, 
construction investment in the steady state has a seasonal pattern as indicated by the seasonal 
intercept dummies in Table 3, investment in the last quarter of the year being 13% lower than 
investment in the first, ceteris paribus. Moreover, a 1% increase in machinery and equipment 
investment will lead to a rise in construction investment of a little over 0.5%, the effect having a 
six-month lag. The dynamics of the machinery and equipment investment equation are rather 
different, with quite small coefficients on lags of the dependent variable: there is much less 
smoothing here, suggesting lower adjustment costs.
9 Nevertheless, an increase in construction 
investment has a positive impact on machinery and equipment investment: a 1% increase in the 
former stimulates the latter by around 0.3% over the subsequent year. 
  Implicit in the ε
B
t variable is a positive long run relationship between construction 
investment and aggregate output, and a negative long run relationship between construction  
9 Less smoothing is also consistent with less hysteresis in investment in machinery and equipment because of 
lower risk. 17
Table 3: The Restricted Investment Model, FIML Estimates
∆ln(IB)
variable         coeff.      std. err.    t ratio      prob.      w.c.s.e. 
∆ln(IB)-         -0.674      0.7742     -3.799      0.0009      0.847
∆ln(IB)-2         -0.6364      0.6060     -3.933      0.0006      0.5422
∆ln(IB)-3         -0.57784      0.4778     -3.90      0.0007      0.3309
∆ln(IB)-4          0.22850      0.967 .909      0.0682      0.93
∆ln(IM)-         -0.520      0.7430     -2.933      0.0073      0.724
ecmM-             0.53444      0.27373      .952      0.0626      0.29054 
ecmB-            -0.4828      0.6952     -2.467      0.02      0.7978
∆ln(Y)-          0.76884      0.55875      .376      0.85      0.67798 
∆ln(C')-         -0.73702      0.3535     -2.337      0.028      0.33792 
ln(PM)-        -0.52620      0.2227     -2.369      0.0263      0.8074
∆ln(PB)-       -0.87350      0.43768     -.996      0.0574      0.3449
∆ln(CWBG)-4    -0.4938      0.0358     -4.72      0.0003      0.03745 
ISRK            -2.50740      0.93524     -2.68      0.03      0.8292
LABIN            0.087      0.04027      2.753      0.0      0.0452
OSLO           -0.24032      0.0463     -5.90      0.0000      0.05228 
LABOUT           -0.5359      0.0476     -3.226      0.0036      0.04224 
Constant           -.0450      4.29560     -0.236      0.853      5.90940 
Seasonal Dummy   -0.02400      0.0586     -0.409      0.6858      0.04809 
Seasonal Dummy 2  -0.09558      0.07044     -.357      0.874      0.0673
Seasonal Dummy 3  -0.262      0.05038     -2.503      0.095      0.0452
σ = 0.05340 
∆ln(IM)
variable         coeff.      std. err.    t ratio      prob.      w.c.s.e. 
∆ln(IB)-         -0.3482      0.5458     -2.2      0.0368      0.7047
∆ln(IB)-2         -0.22686      0.704     -.938      0.0644      0.3937
∆ln(IM)-         0.0476      0.2366      0.063      0.9507      0.24253 
∆ln(IM)-2          0.8046      0.2049      0.896      0.3794      0.785
∆ln(IM)-3          0.25672      0.580 .624      0.75      0.7034
∆ln(IM)-4          0.26560      0.59 .757      0.097      0.8897
ecmM-            -0.9474      0.3295     -2.86      0.0086      0.30569 
ecmB-             0.30296      0.7573 .724      0.0976      0.20607 
∆ln(W)-          -.56340      0.7096     -2.205      0.0373      0.4849
∆ln(CWBG)-4    -0.06382      0.03577     -.784      0.087      0.02828 
ALLK            -.4900      0.57724     -2.583      0.063      0.6655
OSLO            -0.06523      0.0283     -2.39      0.0293      0.03272 
Constant           -6.8050      4.44280     -.533      0.384      3.99350 
Seasonal Dummy    0.05084      0.03872      .33      0.206      0.03252 
Seasonal Dummy 2  -0.0357      0.05369     -0.655      0.587      0.04943 
Seasonal Dummy 3  -0.92      0.0474     -2.36      0.0267      0.04993 
σ = 0.0690
Restricted System Statistics
joint restrictions test: χ²(26) = 23.383 [0.62] cross-equation residual correlation = 0.33536 
ln(L) = 265.92  lnŇΩŇ = -2.663  SBC = -9.459  HQC = -0.403  AIC = -0.949
system error normality: χ²(4) = 4.2058 [0.3789]
system error autocorrelation (order ): F(4,42)  = 0.9076 [0.4683]
system error autocorrelation (order 4): F(6,30) = .7390 [0.0930]
∆ln(IB) equation ARCH (order ): F(,9) = 0.25669 [0.6246]
∆ln(IM) equation ARCH (order ): F(,9) = 0.00470 [0.9468]
∆ln(IB) equation ARCH (order 4): F(4,3) = 0.0546 [0.997]
∆ln(IM) equation ARCH (order 4): F(4,3) = 0.04422 [0.9943]18
  Table 4: Investment Dynamics Implicit in the The ML Estimates
Coefficients significantly different from zero at the 10% level are shown in 
bold.
            ln(I
B)            ln(I
M)
variable    equation  coeff.    equation  coeff. 
ln(I
B)-          -0.09            -0.04 
ln(I
B)-2           0.04             0.09 
ln(I
B)-3           0.05             0.23
ln(I
B)-4           0.81             0.00 
ln(I
B)-5          -0.23             0.00 
ln(I
M)-           0.02             0.07 
ln(I
M)-2           0.51             0.17
ln(I
M)-3           0.00             0.08 
ln(I
M)-4           0.00             0.0
ln(I
M)-5           0.00            -0.27
ņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņ
  Table 5: Weak Exogeneity Tests for ALLK and ISRK
The statistics indicate the significance of each residual in regressions for 
ALLK and ISRK respectively, the set of exogenous regressors being determined 
by the AIC; lags of the dependent variable up to order 5 are used as 
instruments.
residual   ALLK      ISRK 
∆ln(IB)   F(,9) = 2.08 [0.7]   F(,25) = 0.0 [0.9]
∆ln(IM)   F(,9) = 0.00 [0.99]    F(,25) = 0.00 [0.98] 
joint    F(2,9) = .5 [0.34]    F(2,25) = 0.0 [0.99] 
ņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņ



















































































































































Figure 6: Recursive One-Step and Break-Point Chow Tests for 
the System as a Fraction of their 0% Critical Value 20
investment and the real wage. Table 3 indicates that in addition there are temporary effects on 
construction investment of changes in aggregate output (⊄ln(Y)), the interest rate term (ln(C')) 
and the price of construction investment (⊄ln(P
B)). The estimated impact elasticities are, 
respectively, 0.77, -0.74 and -0.87. The only cost term besides the wage rate with a significant 
long run effect is the price of machinery and equipment (ln(P
M)). The impact elasticity 
associated with this variable is -0.53; the dynamics of the construction investment equation 
imply that the long run elasticity is -1.26. In the machinery and equipment investment equation, 
the only significant cost term in addition to those implicit in ⎧
M
t is a negative coefficient on the 
rate of growth of real wages; the estimated impact elasticity is equal to -1.56. 
  The overall picture from Tables 2-3 is that the economic variables dominating the 
evolution of investment in Israel are aggregate output and the real wage rate. Changes in capital 
costs, captured by the real interest rate and the purchase price of capital goods, have some 
temporary impact on investment but (with the exception of the price of machinery and 
equipment) no significant permanent impact. This result is in line with other work on LDC 
investment (Rama, 1993). The results here suggest that to the extent that investors' decisions are 
based on economic factors, they are largely influenced by aggregate demand and labour costs. 
  Perhaps the most interesting feature of the regression results is the role played by 
measures of political instability. Both the number of Israelis killed and the rate of growth of 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza areas have a significantly negative impact on 
investment in non-residential construction. Manufacturing and equipment investment is 
significantly lower when the total number of deaths and rate of growth of the settlements 
increase. Why the two types of investment should appear to be sensitive to different fatality 
statistics is a puzzle; but both types of investment are substantially lower when the indicators of 
political instability are higher. 
  Since the explanatory variables have not been normalised, and all have different sample 
variances, and since the two investment equations have different dynamics, the estimated 
coefficients on the political instability measures are not in themselves very meaningful. For 
example, it is not possible to say just from the coefficients which type of investment is the more 
sensitive to political instability overall. One way of measuring the relative sensitivity of the two 
types of investment to the three political instability variables is to calculate the percentage 
reduction in investment in each type of capital in the steady-state that would result from an 21
increase in the instability measure by one sample standard deviation, ceteris paribus.
10 Using 
the ML estimates, these figures are: 
    ISRK    ALLK    ∆ln(CWBG)
ln(I
B)    7.05    ņņņņ        4.82
ln(I
M) ņņņņ    3.90          2.8
The figures for construction investment are higher than those for machinery and equipment 
investment, which is consistent with the idea that construction investment is more sensitive to 
political instability, as suggested in Section 1. 
  Another way of capturing the size of the political instability effects is to calculate the 
implicit increase in investment if the instability were to be removed completely; that is, if all 
three instability measures fell to zero. In other words, we can estimate the impact of a 
discontinuation of all Palestinian attacks on Israelis (ISRK = 0), plus a discontinuation of all 
demonstrations leading to Israeli security forces killing Palestinians (ALLK = 0), plus a 
cessation of increases in the rate of expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza 
areas (⊄ln(CWBG) = 0). This is one way of quantifying the "peace dividend" for investment, 
though it must be stressed that the Table 2 regressions rely only on the weak exogeneity of the 
explanatory variables. Our calculations ignore any second-order effects, for example the 
possibility that peace will increase output in Israel, either through higher investment or through 
other channels. The calculations are a first-order approximation of the peace dividend for 
investment.
11
  The average total number of politically related deaths in Israel over the sample period 
has been 42.47 per quarter; the average number of Israeli deaths has been 10.74 per quarter. 
Were these figures to fall from their average levels straight to zero, investment in non-
residential construction would immediately rise by 2.7% and machinery and equipment 
investment by 6.3%. In the steady-state, ignoring any effect via changes in the weakly 
10 So for example the first element in the table measures the ML estimate of sd(ISRK) Ňf
B
1/(1 - ∨τ g
B
τ)Ň from 
equation (2). This is a hypothetical exercise, since the ceteris paribus assumption for the other regressors in each 
equation would never actually hold: at the very least, investment in the other type of capital good would be 
changing.  
11 Although the calculations assume no change in the weakly exogenous regressors, they do include the 
interaction between I
B and I
M implicit in the system described by Table 3. 22
exogenous regressors, construction investment would be 24.6% higher than otherwise and 
machinery and equipment investment 14.6% higher than otherwise. The average rate of growth 
of house building in the West Bank and Gaza areas in the sample period has been 3.07% per 
quarter. Were this figure to fall from its average level straight to zero, construction investment 
would immediately rise by 0.46% and machinery and equipment investment by 0.20%. In the 
steady-state, ignoring any effect via changes in the weakly exogenous regressors, construction 
investment would be 2.73% higher than otherwise and machinery and equipment investment 
1.09% higher than otherwise. 
  The investment equations are conditioned on contemporaneous fatality statistics, and a 
potential criticism of the model is that political instability and unrest may depend on the current 
level of economic activity, of which investment demand is one component. Khawaja (1993, 
1995) uses panel data on the incidence of uprisings in different parts of the West Bank in order 
to explore the determinants of the intensity of the Intifada. He does not include any explicitly 
economic variables, but is able to explain a large part of the sample variance by using 
geographical characteristics, the intensity of past activity by the local Israeli security forces, and 
schooling. These results suggest, but do not prove, that the intensity of the Intifada has 
depended largely on social and political factors rather than on economic ones. In order to test 
the hypothesis that our variables ISRK and ALLK are weakly exogenous to investment, we 
employ the method outlined by Engle and Hendry (1993). The investment equation residuals u
i
t
are added to regressions for each of the two fatality series, using lags of ISRKt and ALLKt as 
instruments. The F-test for the joint significance of the u
i
t in the ISRK regression constitutes a 
test of the joint hypothesis that ISRK is weakly exogenous to both types of investment; the same 
logic applies to ALLK. These F-statistics are reported in Table 5. Also in Table 5 are F-statistics 
for the individual significance of each investment equation residual in each fatality regression, 
testing the null hypotheses (i) that ISRK is weakly exogenous to I
B and (ii) that it is weakly 
exogenous to I
M, and similarly for ALLK. None of these statistics is significant at the 10% level, 
so we have no grounds for rejecting the assumption that the fatality statistics are weakly 
exogenous variables. 
  Table 3 also shows the impact on investment of the Oslo Peace Accord, and of the 
Labour Party election victory in 1992 and defeat in 1996, as captured by the dummy variables 
OSLO, LABIN and LABOUT. As anticipated, investment is lower after the accord, ceteris 23
paribus. The impact effect of the accord on construction investment is a 24.0% fall; the 
corresponding figure for machinery and equipment investment is 6.5%. These differences again 
suggest a greater sensitivity to perceived political instability in construction investment. It is 
important to remember, however, that the accord may represent a consequence of political 
uncertainty rather than a cause. And if the Oslo agreement introduced uncertainty about the 
future structure of the Israeli and Palestinian polity, future agreements that resolve this structure 
might well reduce perceived political uncertainty and stimulate higher investment, in addition to 
the increase due to reduced political unrest. 
  The period of Labour Party government corresponded to a significantly higher 
investment rate in construction, but not in machinery and equipment. The impact effect of the 
Labour Party victory in 1992 was an 11.1% increase in construction investment; the impact of 
its defeat in 1996 was a 15.3% reduction in construction investment. One possible explanation 
for this effect is a perception that the extreme right is less influential under labour rule, and that 
this reduces perceived political instability; however, the effect might also be partially explained 
by economic policies more favourable to investment. 
5. Summary and Conclusion
It has been possible to estimate a statistically robust quarterly time-series model of investment in 
Israel for the period 1988-1998, disaggregating investment into non-residential construction and 
machinery and equipment. This model is based on a standard economic representation of a 
profit-maximising firm, but also incorporates time series reflecting the degree of political 
instability in Israel following the Intifada. The construction of these series is motivated by 
recent political science research into the factors affecting perceived political uncertainty in 
Israel. 
  Amongst the economic factors explaining variations in investment over time, the 
strongest effects are through the real wage rate and aggregate demand; capital cost variables 
explain a relatively small part of the variation. There is also a strong complimentarity between 
investment in different types of capital good, although there are substantial differences in the 
dynamics of the equations representing the two types of investment. 
  The most important time-varying factor reflecting political instability and risk is the 
number of people killed in Intifada-related attacks. Both the number of Israelis killed by 24
Palestinian paramilitaries and the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces affect 
aggregate investment. Although the effects are asymmetrical, in that there are significantly 
different consequences of a change in the Israeli fatality figures as compared with a change in 
the total fatality figures, violence of all kinds depresses investment demand. So a substantial 
improvement in investment performance will arise not from increasingly Draconian Israeli 
security measures (which might reduce Israeli fatalities but which are likely, if anything, to 
increase the number of Palestinian casualties) but only from a peace agreement which removes 
the incentive for violent political conflict. We calculate estimates of the increase in investment 
that would occur if there were a lasting peace. The size of the increase is substantial. 
  Other political factors which have influenced aggregate investment are the Oslo Peace 
Accord, general elections and the rate of growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and 
Gaza areas. The effect of settlement growth is negative, although the impact on investment of a 
cessation of the expansion of the settlements would probably be quite small in comparison with 
the impact of an end to political violence. 
  The results of this paper are consistent with previous cross-country work on the impact 
of political instability on investment. But the sensitivity of investment to time-varying political 
instability variables in a quarterly model emphasises the fact that differences in economic 
performance between countries may lie as much in short-term political factors over which 
policymakers potentially have some direct influence as in indices of democracy and other long 
term structural characteristics of the polity. 
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Appendix 1
In this appendix we derive the theoretical model used in Section 2; this is an extension of the model 
used in Rama (1993). There are two types of capital investment in the model: non-residential 
construction (B) and machinery / equipment (M). The optimal level for each type of capital is that 
which maximises the growth in the value of the firm, Π. Π is given by: 




t   (A1) 

















where qt is the firm's output at t, pt the price of this output, wt wages, nt employment, rt the nominal 
interest rate, k
i
t the stock of the i
th type of capital, I
i
t gross investment in this type of capital, v
i
t the 
price of this type of capital good and E[ ] an expectations operator. The firm chooses kt+1, nt+1, qt+1
and (with imperfect competition) pt+1. The first two bracketed terms represent the present 
discounted value of present and future operating profits. The third term represents the cost of 
acquiring new capital goods. The final two terms represent discounted capital gains from changes in 
the value of the firm's capital stock over the two periods. 
  Neither the first nor the last term in equation (A1) is dependent on current investment, and 
will not affect the maximisation problem. Defining these terms as zt, we can write: 




t   (A2) 









The stock of the i







t]/[1 + δ]    (A3) 
δ is the rate of capital depreciation. Substituting equation (A3) into equation (A2): 




t+1 - E[wt+1]⋅nt+1}/[1 + rt] (A4) 
where ct is the user cost of capital net of a capital gains term: 
 c
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t]    (A5) 28
In order to derive a tractable solution for the optimal capital stock, we will assume that output is a 
log-linear function of employment and the firm's stock of each type of capital. We introduce 
adjustment costs by allowing output to depend negatively on the rate of growth of capital 
(productivity is lower when new capital is being installed): 






















     (A6) 
 1  >  α > φ > 0, 1 > β > 0, 1 > γ > ψ > 0, θ > 0 and α + β + γ - φ - ψ≤  1 
The parameter restrictions embody neoclassical assumptions. We will also allow demand for the 
firm's output to depend negatively on its relative price. The demand curve faced by the firm is of the 
form: 
 q t = [Qt/Jt]⋅[pt/Pt]
-σ
, σ > 1      (A7) 
where Qt is aggregate demand in the economy, Pt the average price level and Jt the number of firms 
in the economy. σ > 1 is required to ensure that the firm's revenue (pt⋅qt) is decreasing in its output 
price. As σ→∞  the economy becomes perfectly competitive and goods perfectly homogenous. 
  Substituting equations (A6-A7) into equation (A2) we have: 












































t+1) = [ln(α - φ) - ln(E[c
B
t+1/Pt+1])]⋅[(α - φ)⋅(A + (β + γ - ψ)
-1
) + 1] (A9) 
 +  [ln(β) - ln(E[wt+1/Pt+1])]⋅β⋅A + [ln(γ - ψ) - ln(E[c
M
t+1/Pt+1])]⋅[γ - ψ]⋅A




t)] + ln(E[Q/J]t+1)⋅(σ - 1)⋅A + ln[(σ - 1)/σ]⋅σ⋅A
 ln(k
M
t+1) = [ln(γ - ψ) - ln(E[c
M
t+1/Pt+1])]⋅[(γ - ψ)⋅(A + (α + β - φ)
-1
) + 1] (A10)29
 +  [ln(β) - ln(E[wt+1/Pt+1])]⋅β⋅A + [ln(α - φ) - ln(E[c
B
t+1/Pt+1])]⋅[α - φ]⋅A




t)] + ln(E[Q/J]t+1)⋅(σ - 1)⋅A + ln[(σ - 1)/σ]⋅σ⋅A
where A = [σ - 1]/[σ - (σ - 1)⋅(α + β + γ - φ - ψ)] > 0. In other words, the optimal capital stock is a 
log-linear function of the real user cost of each type of capital, the real wage rate, the average firm 

































t+1])+ a5⋅ln(E[Wt+1]) + a6⋅ln(E[Yt+1])







N.b. the intercept a
i
0 may exhibit some seasonality, if the efficiency parameter θ varies from one 
season to another (for example, because of seasonal fluctuations in agricultural productivity). We 
only have quarterly data on gross investment, not on the net capital stock. The two will be related 




















t-τ    (A13)
τ=1






t+1) + (1 - π)⋅[Σλ τ⋅ln(I
i















t+1])   (A15)





































With Rational Expectations, differences between the expected value of a variable, x, and its actual 
level will be entirely random: 
 ln(E[xt+1]) = ln(xt+1) + u
x
t+1    (A17)
where u
x
t is an i.i.d. random variable. We will not assume Rational Expectations, but allow a more 
general characterisation of expectations in which it is possible (though not necessary) that people 
make systematic prediction errors when x is changing: 
 ln(E[xt+1]) = ln(xt+1) + ζx⋅∆ln(xt+1) + u
x
t+1   (A18)
As ζx gets larger in absolute value, the systematic errors increase in size. We will allow for separate 
expectations formation processes for the variables ln(Y)t, ln(W)t and the two additive components 
of ln(C)t: ln(v
i




t), written below as ln(P
i)t and ln(C')t. Substituting the 
expectations formation equations into equations (A15-A16) yields investment equations of the form 
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i
τ⋅ln(I














7 < 0 < b
i
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τ = (1 - π)⋅(λτ + a1⋅λτ-1), g
M
τ = (1 
- π)⋅a2⋅λτ-1, h
B
τ = (1 - π)⋅a1⋅λτ-1, h
M



























Economic data are taken from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics' Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,31
as provided on the CBS website (http://www.cbs.gov.il). The series are defined as follows: 
I
B  investment in non-residential construction, thousands of 1998 Shekels 
I
M  investment in machinery and non-transport equipment, thousands of 1998 Shekels 
Y  gross domestic product (GDP), thousands of 1998 Shekels 
W  economy-wide average wage rate ÷ gross domestic product deflator 
P
B  deflator for investment in non-residential construction ÷ GDP deflator 
P
M  deflator for investment in machinery and non-transport equipment ÷ GDP deflator 




t], that is, the nominal 
interest rate plus the rate of capital depreciation, plus their product less the rate of capital good price 
inflation. Measurement of rt in Israel is complicated because the yield on government bonds (which 
gives the highest real rate of return of any financial security) is indexed-linked: the bond yield is a 




t], though this is an 
approximation because the indexing is to general inflation rather than to capital good price inflation. 
We assume that δ = 1.5% per quarter: the ln(C')t series exhibits very little variation if this number is 
increased to 2.5% or reduced to 0.5%. Then we approximate rt⋅δ as [bond yield]⋅[consumer price 
inflation]⋅0.015. This last component of C' is very small, and makes no noticeable difference to the 
properties of the series 32
Appendix 3    Table A1: The Unrestricted Investment Model
∆ln(IB)
variable        coeff.      std. err.    t ratio      prob. 
∆ln(IB)-         -0.78338      0.25202     -3.08      0.0072 
∆ln(IB)-2         -0.7540      0.2459     -3.066      0.0078 
∆ln(IB)-3         -0.65649      0.23293     -2.88      0.030
∆ln(IB)-4          0.2078      0.7546 .84      0.2547 
∆ln(IM)-         -0.768      0.42628     -0.403      0.6928 
∆ln(IM)-2          0.3459      0.30747 .023      0.3225 
∆ln(IM)-3         0.09426      0.25466      0.370      0.765
∆ln(IM)-4         0.0737      0.8075      0.405      0.693
ecmM-            0.07606      0.5757      0.33      0.8959 
ecmB-           -0.26933      0.2402     -.22      0.2796 
∆ln(Y)-          0.8869      0.82602 .067      0.3027 
∆ln(W)-          0.00206      0.97658      0.002      0.9983 
∆ln(C')-         -0.5677      0.48964     -.59      0.2644 
∆ln(PB)-         -0.87094      0.85082     -.024      0.3222 
∆ln(PM)-         -0.5693      0.643     -0.257      0.8009 
ln(PB)-           0.36903      0.80209      0.460      0.652
ln(PM)-          -0.6839      0.54799     -.28      0.2768 
∆ln(CWBG)-4      -0.3982      0.04665     -2.998      0.0090 
ISRK            -2.08240      .24920     -.667      0.62
ALLK             -0.36548      .0670     -0.344      0.7355 
LABIN            0.3483      0.05675      2.376      0.033
OSLO             -0.25665      0.06459     -3.974      0.002
LABOUT           -0.3887      0.07283     -.907      0.0759 
Constant           -4.4460      7.2350     -0.66      0.5473 
Seasonal Dummy   -0.00407      0.08777     -0.046      0.9636 
Seasonal Dummy 2  -0.06049      0.09844     -0.64      0.548
Seasonal Dummy 3  -0.0574      0.06948     -.522      0.488
σ = 0.06294  RSS = 0.05943 
∆ln(IM)
variable         coeff.      std. err.    t ratio      prob. 
∆ln(IB)-         -0.54485      0.27838     -.957      0.0692 
∆ln(IB)-2         -0.49529      0.2762     -.823      0.0882 
∆ln(IB)-3         -0.30799      0.25728     -.97      0.2498 
∆ln(IB)-4        -0.09927      0.9380     -0.52      0.659
∆ln(IM)-         -0.00709      0.47085     -0.05      0.9882 
∆ln(IM)-2          0.2980      0.33962      0.647      0.5273 
∆ln(IM)-3          0.36808      0.2829 .309      0.204
∆ln(IM)-4          0.28932      0.9965 .449      0.679
ecmM-            -0.9528      0.6334     -.508      0.523
ecmB-             0.35338      0.26523      .332      0.2026 
∆ln(Y)-          0.770      0.9239      0.29      0.899
∆ln(W)-          -.72590 .07870     -.600      0.304
∆ln(C')-         -0.480      0.54084     -0.773      0.455
∆ln(PB)-          0.68020      0.93979      0.724      0.4803 
∆ln(PM)-         -0.26078      0.67537     -0.386      0.7048 
ln(PB)-          -0.77264      0.88596     -0.872      0.3969 
ln(PM)-           0.42277      0.60529      0.698      0.4956 
∆ln(CWBG)-4      -0.07077      0.0552     -.374      0.897
ISRK              0.66092      .37980      0.479      0.639
ALLK            -2.3538 .7280     -2.007      0.0632 
LABIN             0.04797      0.06268      0.765      0.4560 
OSLO             -0.078      0.0734     -.5      0.55
LABOUT          -0.02062      0.08044     -0.256      0.802
Constant           -5.82950      7.96780     -0.732      0.4757 
Seasonal Dummy    0.456      0.09695 .460      0.649
Seasonal Dummy 2   0.04588      0.0873      0.422      0.6790 
Seasonal Dummy 3  -0.08694      0.07674     -.33      0.275
σ = 0.06953  RSS = 0.07251 33
  Table A1 (Continued)
Unrestricted System Statistics
joint significance of regressors: F(54,28) = 5.434 [0.0000] 
ln(L) = 273.96  lnŇΩŇ = -3.046  R²(LM) = 0.88773 
cross- equation residual correlation = 0.34077 
SBC = -8.240  HQC = -9.656  AIC = -0.474
ņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņņ
  Table A2: SUR Estimates of the Restricted Model
∆ln(IB)
variable         coeff.      std. err.    t ratio      prob. 
∆ln(IB)-         -0.68372      0.7799     -3.84      0.0008 
∆ln(IB)-2         -0.64397      0.656     -3.986      0.0005 
∆ln(IB)-3         -0.59      0.4938     -3.957      0.0006 
∆ln(IB)-4          0.22467      0.224 .853      0.0762 
∆ln(IM)-         -0.5430      0.7424     -2.952      0.0070 
ecmM-             0.53989      0.27388      .97      0.0603 
ecmB-            -0.4432      0.6959     -2.443      0.0223 
∆ln(Y)-          0.7902      0.5645 .400      0.744
∆ln(C')-         -0.7568      0.3847     -2.374      0.0259 
∆ln(PB)-         -0.86898      0.4468     -.967      0.0608 
ln(PM)-   -0.53403      0.2235     -2.389      0.025
∆ln(CWBG)-4      -0.4982      0.03579     -4.86      0.0003 
ISRK            -2.47330      0.94898     -2.606      0.055
LABIN            0.245      0.04076      2.759      0.009
OSLO             -0.24248      0.04652     -5.22      0.0000 
LABOUT           -0.5706      0.0488     -3.260      0.0033 
Constant          -0.84978      4.29230     -0.98      0.8447 
Seasonal Dummy   -0.02097      0.05896     -0.356      0.7252 
Seasonal Dummy 2  -0.09205      0.0707     -.302      0.2053 
Seasonal Dummy 3  -0.2464      0.05033     -2.476      0.0207 
σ = 0.05324 
∆ln(IM)
variable         coeff.      std. err.    t ratio      prob. 
∆ln(IB)-         -0.3463      0.5436     -2.242      0.0344 
∆ln(IB)-2         -0.238      0.690     -.978      0.0596 
∆ln(IM)-         0.03036      0.2378      0.28      0.8992 
∆ln(IM)-2          0.9775      0.20330      0.973      0.3404 
∆ln(IM)-3          0.25947      0.5934 .628      0.65
∆ln(IM)-4          0.26796      0.5360 .744      0.0939 
ecmM-            -0.96282      0.33053     -2.93      0.0076 
ecmB-             0.3097      0.758 .762      0.0909 
∆ln(W)-          -.5770      0.777     -2.97      0.0379 
∆ln(CWBG)-4        -0.06290      0.03573     -.760      0.09
ALLK            -.50520      0.58027     -2.594      0.059
OSLO            -0.06509      0.0282     -2.35      0.0295 
Constant           -6.96670      4.44200     -.568      0.299
Seasonal Dummy    0.050      0.03860 .324      0.980
Seasonal Dummy 2  -0.03556      0.05366     -0.663      0.538
Seasonal Dummy 3  -0.249      0.04736     -2.375      0.0259 
σ = 0.06180 
Restricted System Statistics 
joint restrictions test: ⎢²(26) = 23.42 [0.6090]
ln(L) = 265.9  lnŇΩŇ = -2.662  SBC = -9.458  HQC = -0.402  AIC = -0.948
cross-equation residual correlation = 0.3264
system error normality: ⎢²(4) = 4.802 [0.3822]
system error autocorrelation (order ): F(4,42)  = 0.92675 [0.4576]
system error autocorrelation (order 4): F(6,30) = .73370 [0.0942]
⊄ln(IB) equation ARCH (order ): F(,9) = 0.25065 [0.6286]
⊄ln(IM) equation ARCH (order ): F(,9) = 0.00507 [0.9448]
⊄ln(IB) equation ARCH (order 4): F(4,3) = 0.05636 [0.99]
⊄ln(IM) equation ARCH (order 4): F(4,3) = 0.04282 [0.9946] 